Un análisis de las implicaciones de la asignación de talento humano en las agencias públicas de enforcement
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.18259/dpe.2021007Resumen
Durante el verano de 1996, 45 jóvenes egresados de las carreras de Derecho, Economía e Ingeniería de distintas universidades del Perú fueron seleccionados para cursar estudios especializados en regulación de industrias de redes. Durante tres meses, los estudiantes admitidos debían coexistir en las mismas aulas, donde, bajo un enfoque que pretendía emular las condiciones reales de trabajo multidisciplinario en el sector, fueron adoctrinados conjuntamente en materias de derecho, economía e ingeniería. Uno de los resultados que más llamó la atención de los organizadores fueron las calificaciones obtenidas por los participantes. Contrariamente a lo ocurrido en los módulos de economía e ingeniería, en que los economistas y los ingenieros lograron, respectivamente, las calificaciones más altas; el resultado de las calificaciones de los abogados en los cursos de derecho no fue igualmente favorable para éstos, siendo largamente superados por los ingenieros.
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Derechos de autor 2026 Derecho Público Económico
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